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Abstract 
 
We examine how changes in the information environment can affect real investment decisions.  Using the 
events surrounding mandatory adoption of IFRS as exogenous shocks in information asymmetry, we find 
a significant increase in firms’ investment-to-price sensitivity following IFRS adoption that persists for 
years after the adoption.  These results are in line with the learning hypothesis and suggest that the 
improvements in the information environment lead to stock prices that are more informative, which 
enhances managers’ reliance on stock prices in making investment and other decisions.  We document 
that this increase in investment-to-stock price sensitivity is stronger for firms in countries with weaker ex-
ante institutional and accounting quality as well as for firms that experience a larger improvement in stock 
price informativeness.  Finally, we also show that higher investment-to-stock-price sensitivity is 
associated with improvements in performance. 
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1. Introduction 
More efficient capital markets incorporate information into stock prices quickly and accurately.  
More informative stock prices enable superior decision-making and can guide real decisions such as 
investment (Fama and Miller, 1972).  In line with this view, higher levels of stock price informativeness 
have been associated with more efficient capital allocation (Wurgler, 2000; Durnev, Morck, and Yeung, 
2004) and stock prices that are more informative about future earnings (Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and 
Zarowin, 2003).  Per the leaning hypothesis (Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein, 2012; Focault and Fresard, 
(2011), when stock prices are more informative managers are able to extract valuable information from 
them and make more informed investments decisions, which leads to an increase in the sensitivity of 
corporate investment to stock prices (Chen, Goldstein, and Wei, 2007).   
Our study builds on the above literature and tests the predictions of the learning hypothesis by 
examining how an exogenous change in the information environment – namely, the mandatory adoption 
of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) – can affect real investment decisions.  We show 
that firms’ investment-to-price sensitivity increases significantly following the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS.  The increase in investment-to-price sensitivity begins in the year after IFRS adoption and this 
effect lasts up to 5 years following IFRS adoption.  The increase in investment-to-price sensitivity is 
stronger for firms in countries with weaker ex-ante institutional and accounting quality and for firms that 
experience a more significant improvement in stock price informativeness. We do not find evidence that 
the greater sensitivity of investment to stock prices observed after IFRS adoption is driven by firms’ 
improved access to external finance, suggesting that this effect is driven at least in part, by improvements 
in the informational content of stock prices, consistent with the learning hypothesis. 
International Financial Reporting Standards were designed primarily to provide more accurate, 
comprehensive, and timely financial statement information, and to reduce international differences in 
accounting standards by standardizing reporting formats.  Existing literature documents that IFRS require 
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greater disclosure and are more comprehensive than local accounting standards (Ashbaugh and Pincus, 
2001; Ding, Hope, Jeanjean, and Stolowi, 2007) and improve the comparability of firms across markets, 
which improves capital allocation efficiency (Covrig, Defond, and Hung, 2007; Armstrong, Barth, 
Jagolinzer, and Riedl, 2010).  Improved disclosure should reduce information asymmetry, enhance 
liquidity and reduce the cost of capital (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Easley and O’Hara, 2004).  
Empirical evidence supports the view that IFRS adoption (or events surrounding the adoption) is 
associated with a reduction in information asymmetry among investors and between insiders and 
outsiders (Daske, Hail, Leuz, and Verdi, 2008, 2011; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Li, 2010).  These 
studies emphasize the importance of both enforcement and firms' reporting incentives on the impact of 
IFRS adoption.   
Given the documented evidence suggesting a decrease in information asymmetry associated with 
the introduction of IFRS, the adoption of IFRS provides a natural experiment to examine the impact of 
changes in the information environment on stock price informativeness; in particular, we examine the real 
consequences of IFRS adoption by exploring how this affects the investment-to-price sensitivity.  We 
directly test implications of the learning hypothesis.  First, we examine whether IFRS adoption leads to an 
increase in investment-to-stock price sensitivity.  Second, we explore how differences in the institutional 
and accounting quality at the country level affect the impact of IFRS adoption on investment-to-price 
sensitivity; countries with weaker ex-ante shareholder protection and accounting quality should be the 
ones that benefit more from the adoption of IFRS, therefore, improvements in the information 
environment and its impact on investment-to-stock price sensitivity should be more pronounced in these 
countries. Finally, we test whether the increase in investment-to-stock price sensitivity following IFRS 
adoption is more pronounced for firms that experience an improvement in the informational content of 
their stock prices against the alternative that this effect might be driven by the improved access to external 
finance that firms experience post-IFRS. 
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We test our hypotheses using a differences-in-differences methodology using a treatment group 
of IFRS adopters and a control group of firms from countries that did not adopt IFRS during our sample 
period.  Our sample consists of 25,168 firms (159,770 firm-year observations) from 50 countries for the 
period 1990-2012.  Our treatment sample consists of 11,611 firms from 30 countries that adopted IFRS 
during our sample period and require listed firms to report their financial statements in accordance with 
IFRS, and we use a control group of 13,557 firms from 20 countries that had not adopted IFRS as of 
2011.  We find evidence consistent with our hypotheses.  First, we document an overall increase in 
investment sensitivity-to-stock price following IFRS adoption for our sample firms, relative to a control 
group from non-IFRS adopting countries. This increase starts in the year after the adoption of IFRS and is 
observed up to five years following IFRS adoption.  Second, we document a stronger impact on firms 
from countries with weaker institutional and accounting quality.  Third, we document that the increase in 
investment-stock-price sensitivity is stronger for firms that experience a more significant improvement in 
stock price informativeness; in addition, we find that this result is not driven by the well documented 
decrease in firms’ cost of capital following mandatory IFRS adoption.   Finally, we find a positive 
association between investment-to-stock price sensitivity and firm performance (ROA and sales growth) 
post-IFRS adoption, providing additional support to the learning hypothesis.  Our evidence supports the 
predictions of the learning hypothesis and suggests that the events surrounding IFRS adoption are 
associated with improvements in the precision of information conveyed by stock prices to managers. The 
results still hold after a variety of robustness tests, including the use of alternative measures of 
investment, various matching techniques, and alternate measures of stock price informativeness.  
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways.  First, we contribute to the growing 
literature on the informational role of market prices and their impact on real economic activity (see e.g. 
Bond et al., 2012).  We add to this literature by providing some evidence on how changes at the country 
level can enhance the informational content of stock prices and affect real investment decisions; our 
evidence shows that improvements in the information environment can enhance the value of the 
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information that managers are able to extract from stock prices.    We also add to the literature on the 
impact of IFRS adoption by exploring its impact on another important outcome measure, its effect on 
stock price informativeness and investment. In addition, we provide further evidence on the importance of 
countries’ institutional quality in determining the effects of mandatory IFRS adoption.  While the results 
presented in the paper show a positive impact of IFRS adoption on investment-sensitivity to stock price, 
our results should not be interpreted as IFRS adoption being the sole driver of these effects.  As argued in 
other studies (see e.g. Christensen, Hail, and Leuz, 2011), several other events associated with the 
introduction of IFRS took place in IFRS adopting countries.  It is thus hard to empirically disentangle 
such effects from the pure effects of IFRS adoption, especially when those effects happened in the same 
year as the adoption of IFRS.  However, the purpose of our study is to examine the effect of changes in 
information asymmetry, and we are thus not strictly examining the effects of IFRS adoption. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  In section 2 we review the related literature and 
develop our hypotheses; in section 3 we describe our data and the methodology used in our analyses; in 
section 4 we present our main findings on the impact of IFRS adoption on investment-to-stock price 
sensitivity and some additional robustness tests; in section 5 we conclude. 
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
2.1. Stock Price Informativeness and Investment-to-Stock Price sensitivity 
Early work by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) suggests that because information is costly, stock 
prices reflect only a subset of all relevant information.  As the cost of private information declines, 
informed trading increases, which leads to more informative pricing.  More informative stock prices can 
improve the investment decisions made by managers who learn from stock prices when making decisions 
such as investment (Chen et al., 2007; Bakke and Whited, 2010).  As argued by Bond et al. (2012), while 
managers have more information than outsiders, stock prices can still convey new information that is 
relevant to decision makers as long as managers do not possess perfect information about all decision-
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relevant factors.  This is because stock prices aggregate information from many speculators who 
collectively may be more informed (Grossman, 1976; Hellwig, 1980).  In addition, decisions by managers 
depend on both firm-specific information (of which managers may have an advantage) as well as 
additional macro factors (e.g. state of the economy; industry factors).   
In line with the view that managers learn from stock prices in making investment and other 
decisions, a reduction in information asymmetry that leads to improved stock price informativeness 
should lead to an increase the investment-to-stock-price sensitivity, as more informative stock prices help 
to guide investment decisions.  This idea is parallel to the argument developed by Focault and Gehrig 
(2008) with respect to cross-listings.  In a test of the implications of their theory, Focault and Fresard 
(2011) find that investment-to-price sensitivity increases following a cross-listing in the U.S. market, and 
that the increase is more pronounced for cross-listings that are more likely to strengthen the 
informativeness of stock prices.  Their results are in line with the learning hypothesis.  After cross-listing, 
investors have more trading venues in which they can exploit their private information; in addition, cross-
listing gives access to informed investors located in the host market who may have been unable or 
unwilling to trade prior to cross-listing.  If there is a reduction in information asymmetry following the 
adoption of IFRS (perhaps as more investors are inclined to invest because of a decrease in the costs of 
obtaining information), stock prices should become more informative for managers and they should be 
able to extract more (and more precise) information from stock prices, which should make capital 
expenditures more sensitive to stock prices.   
Empirical evidence on the consequences of the adoption of IFRS points to positive effects 
associated with the mandatory adoption of IFRS, which are in line with a reduction in information 
asymmetry.  Armstrong et al. (2010) document incrementally positive reactions associated with events 
related to IFRS adoption for firms with lower pre-adoption information quality and higher information 
asymmetry, which suggests that investors perceive that IFRS will lead to improvements in information 
quality.  Other studies show that mandatory IFRS adoption improves market liquidity and lowers firms’ 
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cost of capital (Daske et al., 2008; Li, 2010).  These results are in line with the information asymmetry 
literature documenting that increased disclosure reduces the cost of equity capital by mitigating adverse 
selection problems and enhancing liquidity (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Easley and O’Hara, 2004).  
In addition, two recent studies find a link between IFRS adoption and stock price informativeness.  
Beuselinck, Joos, Khurana, and Van der Meulen (2010) examine the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption 
on stock price informativeness across EU countries, while Kim and Shi (2010) examine the consequences 
of voluntary IFRS adoption for firms in 34 countries from 1998-2004.  Kim and Shi (2010) find that stock 
price synchronicity decreases following voluntary IFRS adoption, especially for firms with high analyst 
coverage in countries with weak institutional structures.  Beuselinck et al. (2010) use a sample of 2,173 
mandatory IFRS adopters in 14 EU countries over the 2003-2007 period and document a decrease in 
stock price synchronicity around IFRS adoption; they interpret their results as consistent with IFRS 
disclosures revealing new firm-specific information in the adoption period.  
Building on the above ideas, we develop our first hypothesis.  If the adoption of IFRS is 
associated with a reduction in information asymmetry that leads to an improvement in stock price 
informativeness, we should observe an increase in investment-to-stock price sensitivity following IFRS 
adoption.  The improved transparency and increased disclosure quality that has been associated with IFRS 
adoption should in turn reduce the costs of obtaining information for investors.  Stock prices would thus 
incorporate more information new to managers, which they in turn would use in making their investment 
decisions.  This leads to our first testable hypothesis: 
H1:  Investment-stock price sensitivity should increase following IFRS adoption.  
The impact of IFRS adoption on investment-to-price sensitivity should vary based on country 
characteristics.  As shown by McLean et al. (2012), firms in countries with stronger investor protection 
and institutional quality have higher investment sensitivity-to-stock price; thus, firms in countries with 
poor institutional quality may stand to gain the most from a change in the information environment that 
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improves the informational content of stock prices.  In addition, per the learning hypothesis, if 
improvements in the information environment are driving the increase in investment sensitivity to stock 
price, the increase should be more pronounced in countries with weaker ex-ante accounting quality, or in 
countries with accounting standards that differ significantly from IFRS.  In such countries, the changes in 
disclosure requirements brought about by the adoption of IFRS should be greater; thus, the improvement 
in information available to investors should lead to a stronger increase in investment-to-stock price 
sensitivity may be lower in those countries.  In line with these arguments we formulate our second 
hypothesis: 
H2:  The increase in investment-to-stock-price sensitivity following IFRS adoption should be more 
pronounced in countries with weaker institutional quality and accounting standards. 
Our final hypothesis examines how firm level characteristics affect the impact of the events 
surrounding IFRS adoption on investment-sensitivity to stock price.  With improvements in stock price 
informativeness, stock prices will convey more new information to managers which they will use to guide 
their investment decisions.  The learning hypothesis predicts that the improvement in investment 
sensitivity-to-stock price is driven by the increased production of information following IFRS adoption.  
A reduction in information asymmetry should reduce the costs associated with obtaining information; this 
reduction in costs encourage more investors to trade on their information, which should lead to more 
information being impounded into stock prices.  This should make stocks more informative for managers 
and decision makers, who could use this information to guide their investment decisions.  If 
improvements in the informativeness of prices are driving the increase in investment-to-stock price 
sensitivity, the effect should be stronger for stocks that contain more information for managers. We posit 
that stock prices that become more informative (i.e. those that experience the largest increase in stock 
price informativeness) should contain more new information for decision makers, all else equal. We thus 
develop our final hypothesis: 
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H3:  The increase in investment-to-stock-price sensitivity following IFRS adoption should be more 
pronounced for firms whose stock prices become more informative. 
3.  Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data Description 
We examine the impact of IFRS adoption on investment sensitivity to stock price using a broad 
sample of firms from 50 countries from 1990-2012.  Our sample includes firms from 30 countries that 
adopted IFRS during our sample period, as well as a control group of firms from 20 countries that have 
not adopted IFRS by 2011.  We obtain dates of actual and planned IFRS adoption for each country from 
Deloitte’s IAS Plus and verify these dates using various other sources.2  Our sample of IFRS adopting 
countries includes those that adopt IFRS and require listed firms to report financial statements in 
accordance with IFRS.  We thus exclude a few countries that have adopted IFRS, but do not require listed 
firms (but rather make it optional) to report based on IFRS.
3
  Our goal is to assess how an exogenous 
shock in information asymmetry affects investment to stock price sensitivity; as such, we choose 
countries in which all listed firms are required to adopt IFRS.   
Our initial sample consists of all firms covered in Thomson Financial’s WorldScope database.  From 
WorldScope we collect information on each firm’s total assets, market value of equity, capital 
expenditures, property plant and equipment, cash flows, book value of equity, sales, and additional 
variables used as controls.  Following the literature (e.g. Focault and Fresard, 2011), we exclude firms 
from regulated industries (financials and utilities, SIC codes between 6000 and 6999 and between 4900 
and 4949).  We proceed with our data screening by excluding firms with missing data on total assets, 
                                                                
2
 http://www.IASplus.com/country/useIAS.htm.  We also cross-check dates from other sources including the 
European Corporate Governance Institute and PWC website.  
3
 Specifically, we exclude the following countries from our sample: Hong Kong; Philippines; Singapore; 
Switzerland, and Turkey.  We exclude these countries because either Deloitte’s IAS website or the PWC report on 
IFRS adoption by country indicates that IFRS is not required for all firms in such countries.  As an example, 
Deloitte’s IAS website reports that firms in Turkey are permitted but not required to follow IFRS and that IFRS is 
not required for all listed firms in Philippines.  In addition, the PWC report states that IFRS is permitted (not 
required) for firms in Singapore and Switzerland.  
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sales, or capital expenditures. Moreover, to make firms more comparable across countries, we further 
eliminate those with negative sales or total assets lower than $10 million.  We also winsorize all variables 
at the top and bottom 1% of the distribution to mitigate the influence of outliers.  This screening process 
leads to a final sample of 25,618 firms from 50 countries.  Our treatment sample includes 11,611 firms 
from 30 countries that have adopted IFRS and our control group consists of 13,557 firms from 20 
countries that have not adopted IFRS.  For these firms, we also collect data on stock prices from 
DataStream to construct our measures of stock price informativeness.   
To identify firms in each country that voluntarily adopt IFRS prior to the mandatory adoption 
year, we use the “Accounting Standards Followed” variable (WorldScope item WC07536).4  Thus, we 
classify a firm as a voluntary adopter if the firm reports financial statements according to IFRS (or 
similar) prior to the mandatory adoption year in the country (e.g. 2005 for European Union members).  
Throughout the paper we use the broader definition of IFRS adopters proposed by Daske et al. (2011) in 
which firms following international standards, or local standards with EU and IASC guidelines are also 
coded as IFRS adopters.5   
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of our sample, including the year of mandatory IFRS 
adoption for our IFRS-adopting countries.  Our sample is fairly geographically diverse, although the 
majority of our IFRS adopters are from the European Union.  Most countries that adopted IFRS did so in 
2005, or after.  Bulgaria is the one exception, adopting IFRS as of 2003.   
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of all our main firm-level variables.  Panel A shows 
descriptive statistics from the IFRS-adopting countries, while Panel B reports statistics for the control 
group.  Our treatment (control) firms have average assets of $1.7 ($1.8) billion, and average Tobin’s q of 
                                                                
4
 We also use this variable (WC07536) to identify those firms that are not required (and thus do not report) under 
IFRS after the mandate in the country, following Christensen et al. (2012).  
 
5
 The precise classifications are described in Table A1 of Daske et al. (2011). 
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1.6 (1.7).  Capital expenditures represent 31% (24.5%) of lagged property, plant and equipment for our 
treatment (control) group of firms, while cash flows are 6.7% (6.6%) of total assets.     
3.2. Investment sensitivity to stock price 
Our main hypotheses test for changes in the investment sensitivity-to-stock price relation around 
the mandatory adoption of IFRS.  To control for factors that may influence investment-sensitivity-to-
stock price that are not related to the changes in the information environment around the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS, we employ a differences-in-differences approach using a control group of firms from 
countries that did not adopt IFRS during our sample period.  Specifically, to estimate the investment-to-
stock price sensitivity relation, we follow the literature (see e.g. Focault and Fresard, 2011; Baker, Stein, 
and Wurgler, 2003; Rauh, 2006), and run several specifications of the following regression: 
                                                                       
                                                  (1) 
 
where Ii,t is a measure of corporate investment for firm i in year t - measured as the ratio of capital 
expenditures scaled by lagged property, plant, and equipment; Q is normalized stock price, measured as 
market value of equity (stock price times shares outstanding) plus total assets less book value of equity 
scaled by the book value of total assets;  CF is cash flow (net income plus R&D and depreciation and 
amortization), scaled by lagged total assets;  Post is an indicator variable that is equal to one beginning 
the year after the mandatory adoption of IFRS in the country, and 0 otherwise; for countries in the control 
group (non-IFRS adopters), we set Post equal to one if year t is greater than 2005, and 0 otherwise; IFRS 
is an indicator variable that is equal to one for firms in our treatment group of countries that adopted IFRS 
during our sample period.  We include a proxy for size (log of total assets), reflecting 2010 prices, to 
control for the impact of size on firm’s investment decisions; in addition, cash flow (CF) is included to 
control for the well- established relation between cash flow and investment.  In our main specifications, 
we use year, country, and industry fixed effects to control for additional unobservable or omitted factors 
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that may influence investment and we cluster standard errors at the firm level, allowing for the error term 
to be serially correlated for the same firm.  Because of our fixed effects framework, some of the 
coefficients in Equation 1 drop out because of collinearity.  In additional robustness tests, we replicate our 
results using alternate specifications of Equation 1, including firm and year fixed effects and clustering 
standard errors at the country level.  
 Our main variable of interest is the coefficient on the triple interaction term (β3), which captures 
the change in investment-to-stock price sensitivity post-IFRS for our treatment group, relative to the 
control group of firms from countries that did not adopt IFRS.  A positive coefficient on β3 would reflect 
an increase in investment-to-stock price sensitivity post-IFRS adoption for our IFRS adopters, consistent 
with our main hypotheses.     
4. Results 
4.1. Investment sensitivity to stock price around IFRS adoption 
In this section, we first examine whether IFRS adoption is associated with an increase in 
investment-to-stock price sensitivity.  Table 3 shows results from various specifications of Equation 1.  
Consistent with prior studies (Chen et al., 2007; Focault and Fresard, 2011), investment is positively 
related to stock price (Q); the coefficient on Qt-1 is statistically significant at the 1% level in all model 
specifications.  The main variable of interest is the coefficient on the triple interaction term between (Q x 
Post x IFRS - i.e., β3), which captures the change in investment sensitivity to stock price after the 
adoption of IFRS for our treatment firms.  Per Hypothesis 1, investment-to-stock price sensitivity should 
increase post-IFRS adoption as stock prices become more informative and managers are able to learn 
more from stock prices after the reduction in information asymmetry, which should translate into a 
positive correlation between stock prices and investment.  No such increase is expected for our control 
group of firms.  Thus, Hypothesis 1 would predict a positive and significant coefficient on β3.  As the 
results in Table 3 show, that is indeed what we find.  All specifications show a positive and significant 
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coefficient on β3, suggesting an increase in investment-to-stock price sensitivity following IFRS adoption 
for our group of IFRS adopters.  This result is both statistically and economically significant.  Taking the 
coefficients in model 1 as an example, a one standard deviation increase in Q (1.7) is associated with an 
increase of 5.78% ((0.038+-0.004) x 1.7) in investment prior to IFRS adoption, for the average IFRS 
adopter.  Following IFRS adoption, the increase in investment associated with a one standard deviation 
increase in Q is substantially larger – 9.52% ((0.038+-0.004+0.022) x 1.7).  The magnitude of the 
increase is similar across the various specifications.  The remaining control variables have the expected 
signs documented in prior studies.  Cash flows (CF) are positively related to investment, while the proxy 
for firm size (log assets) is inversely correlated with investment.  The results also show that there is no 
significant difference in investment-to-stock price sensitivity between our treatment firms and our control 
sample prior to IFRS adoption – the coefficient on the interaction term (Qt-1 x IFRS) is not statistically 
significant.   
We test the robustness of our results by estimating various specifications of Equation 1 in Panel A 
of Table 3.  In model 2, we run regressions using firm and year fixed effects to better control for time 
invariant firm-specific characteristics, instead of the country, industry, and year fixed effects used in 
model 1.  Results are similar when this alternate approach is used.  We thus present the remaining results 
using our baseline specification with country, industry, and year fixed effects.  One concern with our 
results is the fact that the increase in investment-to-price sensitivity following IFRS adoption may be 
driven by firms that adopt IFRS voluntarily before the mandatory date.  To address this concern, in model 
3, we estimate equation 1 excluding all firms that are classified as voluntary IFRS adopters.  The results 
continue to show an increase in investment-stock-price sensitivity following IFRS adoption even after 
excluding voluntary adopters.  Given that we include a control group of firms from non-adopting firms in 
our main regressions, one concern is that differences in size between the two groups may be driving the 
results.  While we control for size in our regressions, we further address this valid concern by estimating 
regressions using only a subset of matched firms from the control group of countries.  Specifically, each 
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year, we match each treatment firm in our sample to a firm from the control group by industry (4-digit 
SIC code) and size.  For each treatment firm, we choose a firm in its same 4-digit SIC code from the 
control group of countries that is closest in size. We then run regressions including our treatment firms 
and their respective matches.  The results are reported in models 4 and 5 of Table 3, including and 
excluding voluntary adopters, respectively.  The results confirm our prior findings.  Finally, in models 6 
and 7 we estimate Equation 1 including the firms in our treatment group only.  The results continue to 
hold even when we exclude firms from our control group.  
In Panel B of Table 3 we provide some additional robustness tests.  First, we replicate our results 
excluding firms from the U.S. from our control group.  Firms from the US dominate our control group of 
countries; thus, what we may be picking up are differences between our IFRS adopters and US firms, 
which may be unrelated to improvements in information. The results in model 1 of Panel B show that our 
results continue to hold, and are very similar in magnitude, when we exclude the US.  In model 2 we 
present results for a matched sample of firms using an alternate matching procedure.  Given that our 
control group of countries is comprised primarily of firms from emerging markets (with some 
exceptions), what our results could be picking up are differences in information quality between emerging 
and developed countries.  Ideally, we would like to match firms from countries with similar accounting 
standards before the adoption of IFRS, to tease out the impact of IFRS adoption on the quality of 
information and the resulting investment sensitivity to stock price.  We attempt to do this by first 
matching each country in our treatment group to a country from the control group with similar accounting 
standards using the measure of GAAP differences from Bae, Tan, and Welker (2008).
6
  We match 
                                                                
6 This measure captures differences between local accounting standards and International Accounting 
Standards (IAS) for each country based on 21 key accounting items.  For each of these 21 items, a score 
of one is assigned for that item to countries that do not conform to IAS and 0 otherwise.  Higher values of 
the aggregate score reflect larger differences between local accounting standards and IAS.   .   
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countries with the minimum GAAP differences.
7
  We then match each firm in our treatment group, each 
year, with its closest match by industry (4-digit SIC code) and size (total assets) from the respective 
GAAP-differences-matched country.  While the sample size drops, because certain matched countries 
may not have firms in certain industries, the results using this matching procedure confirm our prior 
results.  The results are shown in Model 2 of Panel B; relative to matched firms from countries with 
similar accounting quality, there is a significant increase in the investment-to-stock-price sensitivity 
following IFRS for firms from IFRS adopting countries: a one percent increase in Q is associated with a 
0.07% (0.034+-0.016+0.048)*0.01) increase in investment after IFRS adoption.   The last two columns in 
Panel B of Table 3 replicate our results using two alternate proxies for investment: capital expenditures 
plus R&D-scaled by lagged assets, and total asset growth.   The results using these alternate proxies are in 
line with our prior results, as the coefficients of the triple interaction term are still positive and statistically 
significant.    
Overall, the results in Table 3 provide strong support for Hypothesis 1.  Investment sensitivity to 
stock price increases significantly following the adoption of IFRS.   These results are robust to alternate 
definitions of investment, various matching procedures, and different regression specifications.  Next, we 
examine whether the increase in investment stock price sensitivity materializes on or after the year of 
IFRS adoption. 
4.2. Event time regressions 
If the increase in investment sensitivity to stock price following IFRS adoption is associated with 
more new information available to managers due to the reduction in information asymmetry, the result 
should materialize subsequent to the year of IFRS adoption.  We test this prediction more closely by 
analyzing the year-by-year changes in investment-to-stock price sensitivity for our treatment sample of 
                                                                
7 When there is more than one matching country with the same GAAP difference, we match our treatment 
country with the country that is either in the same geographical region, or closest in terms of GDP per 
capita. 
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firms from countries that adopt IFRS.  To do this, we follow the approach used by Focault and Fresard 
(2011).  Specifically, we define a set of event-time indicator variables IFRSt (-τ) and IFRSt (+τ), for τ=0,1, 
…5.   IFRSt (τ) is equal to one if year t is τ years from or since IFRS adoption.  We then interact these 
event-time indicator variables with lagged Q.  This approach allows us to estimate the investment 
sensitivity to price relation for each year over a 10-year window around the adoption of IFRS.   
The results from the event-time regressions are shown in Table 4.  The results provide support to 
the view that the investment-to-stock price sensitivity increase happens only after the mandatory adoption 
of IFRS.  These findings are in line with the learning hypothesis and support the view that the increase is 
driven in part by the increase in the informativeness of stock prices for managers.  The results in model 1 
show that the investment-to-stock price sensitivity for firms in countries that adopt IFRS increases 
significantly but only in the year after IFRS adoption.  In years prior to IFRS adoption, there is no 
significant relation between investment and stock price, with the exception of one year (and the relation is 
weak).
8
  The investment-to-stock price sensitivity becomes positive and significant starting the year after 
IFRS adoption and the effect is persistent and shows up even 5 years after the adoption of IFRS, although 
it is not statistically significant in year 3.  A plausible explanation as to why the investment-to-stock price 
sensitivity is not as statistically significant in years 2 and 3 post-IFRS adoption relates to the financial 
crisis.  For the majority of our sample, mandatory IFRS adoption happens in 2005.  Thus, years two and 
three after IFRS adoption coincide with the height of the financial crisis in which stock prices were 
depressed and firms were not investing as much; this in turn could lead to a reduced investment-to-stock 
price sensitivity.  Of importance is the fact that the positive relationship between investment-to-stock 
price sensitivity is only significant in years subsequent to IFRS adoption.    
In model 2 we show results excluding voluntary IFRS adopters and continue to find a positive 
and significant investment-to-stock price sensitivity starting the year after IFRS adoption.  The results in 
model 2 show that there is no significant relation between investment and Q prior to the adoption of 
                                                                
8
 This result is likely driven by the inclusion of voluntary IFRS adopters in our sample.  In model 2, we exclude 
voluntary IFRS adopters and find no significant relationship between investment and stock price pre-IFRS adoption. 
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IFRS; this suggests that the positive association between investment-to stock price sensitivity found in the 
year prior to IFRS adoption in model 1 could be attributed to the inclusion of voluntary adopters in the 
sample.
9
     
4.3. Impact of country characteristics on investment sensitivity to stock price around IFRS adoption 
The increase in investment sensitivity to stock price following IFRS adoption documented earlier 
may differ across countries; in particular, investor protection may play a significant role in how new 
information impounded into stock prices may affect investment.  McLean et al. (2012) show that investor 
protection is positively associated with investment-to-stock price sensitivity;  firms in countries with 
better ex-ante institutional quality exhibit a larger investment-to-stock price sensitivity;  as such,  firms in 
countries with poor institutional quality may stand to gain the most from a change in the information 
environment that improves the informational content of stock prices.  In addition, per the learning 
hypothesis, if improvements in the information environment are driving the increase in investment 
sensitivity to stock price, the increase should be more pronounced in countries with weaker ex-ante 
accounting quality, or in countries with accounting standards that differ significantly from IFRS.  The 
change in information asymmetry and the improvements in disclosure and in the overall information 
environment should be stronger in countries that have weak accounting standards, relative to IFRS.  In 
line with this argument, Hypothesis 2 predicts that countries with weaker institutional quality and weaker 
accounting standards (those that differ widely from IFRS) should observe a larger increase in investment-
to-stock price sensitivity following IFRS adoption.  We test this hypothesis by estimating Equation 1 
separately for countries with high/low investor protection and institutional quality and accounting 
standards.  In particular, we first divide countries based on 1) the origin commercial laws – common vs. 
civil law, following the literature that argues that common law countries have better investor protection 
(e.g. La Porta, Lopez De Silanes, and Shleifer 1997; 1998); 2) the revised anti-director’s rights index 
                                                                
9
 Improvements in the information environment associated with voluntary IFRS adoption may trigger an increase in 
investment-to-stock price sensitivity for these early adopters prior to the mandatory adoption of IFRS in their 
country. 
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(ADIR) from La Porta et al. (1998) updated in Djankov, La Porta, Lopez De Silanes, and Shleifer (2008); 
3) a measure of differences between local accounting standards and International Accounting Standards 
(GAAP difference) from Bae et al. (2008), and 4) a measure of overall accounting quality and 
transparency that is the sum of earnings aggressiveness, loss avoidance, and earnings smoothing from 
Bhattacharya, Daouk, and Welker (2003) and the timeliness measures from Bushman, Piotroski, and 
Smith (2004).  We group IFRS adopting countries into high/low institutional quality based on these 
indices; countries with index values above (below) the median are classified as high (low).  Note that 
unlike the other three measures, countries with lower accounting quality are those with a high GAAP 
difference.  We include country, industry, and year fixed effects in all of our regressions and cluster 
standard errors at the firm level.   
We report our results in Table 5.  As before, our main variable of interest is the interaction term 
between Qt-1 and the Post-IFRS indicator variable.  Per Hypothesis 2, the coefficient on this interaction 
term should be positive and significant in countries with weaker ex-ante institutional and accounting 
quality; in addition, the magnitude of the increase in investment-to-stock price sensitivity should be larger 
in countries with better institutional quality.   
The results in Table 5 provide support for Hypothesis 2.  The results show that firms in civil law 
countries and in countries with lower investor protection experience a significant increase in investment-
to-stock price sensitivity following the mandatory adoption of IFRS.  In contrast, firms in countries with 
high institutional quality do not experience a significant increase in investment-to-stock price sensitivity 
following IFRS adoption.  The results are both statistically as well as economically significant.  Taking 
the coefficients in Model 2 as an example, prior to IFRS adoption, a one standard deviation increase in Q 
(1.7) is associated with a 5.44% [(0.029+0.003)*1.7] increase in investment for firms in civil law 
countries that adopt IFRS; the impact of a one standard deviation increase in Q on investment more than 
doubles after IFRS adoption to 11.22% ([0.029+0.003+0.034] x 1.7)).  In contrast, there is no significant 
increase in investment-to-stock price sensitivity in common law countries.  The impact is similar using 
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other proxies for institutional quality.  Taking the coefficients in Model 4, a one standard deviation in Q is 
associated with a 5.95% (0.035 x 1.7) increase in investment prior to the adoption of IFRS for firms in 
countries with low investor protection, and with a significantly higher 11.73% [(0.35+0.034) x 1.7)] 
increase in investment following IFRS adoption.  To examine the robustness of our results, in Models 5-8 
of Panel A we run the regressions using only our sample firms and their respective matches (on 4-digit 
SIC codes and size) from the control group of countries.  The results continue to show that the increase in 
investment-to-stock-price sensitivity after IFRS adoption is only significant for firms in countries with 
lower institutional quality.   
Panel B of Table 5 shows results in which we split our sample based on ex-ante accounting 
quality.  In line with Hypothesis 2, the results show that firms in countries with ex-ante accounting 
standards that differ widely from IFRS, and those in countries with low accounting quality exhibit a 
significant improvement in investment-to-stock-price sensitivity following IFRS adoption.  In contrast, 
the increase in investment-to-stock price sensitivity is insignificant for firms in countries with better ex-
ante accounting standards.  The results are both economically and statistically significant.  As an example, 
the coefficients in Model 1 show that, prior to IFRS adoption, a one standard deviation increase in Q 
(1.41) for firms in countries with accounting standards that differ widely from IFRS is associated with a 
6.91% increase in investment.  After IFRS adoption, a one standard deviation increase in q is associated 
with a much larger increase in investment (9.73%).
10
  The results are similar for firms in IFRS adopting 
countries with low accounting quality.  Results using only matched firms (Columns 5-8) also confirm our 
main findings that the increase in investment-to-stock-price sensitivity following IFRS adoption is only 
significant in countries with weaker ex-ante accounting standards. 
The results in this section provide support to Hypothesis 2 and are consistent with the view that 
firms in countries with weaker ex-ante institutional and accounting quality stand to gain the most from 
                                                                
10
 The standard deviation of Tobin’s q for firms in countries with high GAAP differences is 1.41.  For IFRS 
adopters, the pre-adoption increase in investment associated with a one standard deviation increase in Q is 
[(0.030+0.019) x 1.41] = 0.0691.  Post-IFRS, the impact increases to [(0.030+0.019+0.02) 0.0973. 
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improvements in the information environment.  These results are consistent with the predictions of the 
learning hypothesis (e.g. Bond et al., 2012).  The exogenous shock to the information environment 
brought about by the events surrounding the adoption of IFRS should be stronger for firms in countries 
with weaker institutional quality and accounting standards.  Thus, firms in such countries should observe 
a more significant improvement in the informational content of their stock prices, which should translate 
into a higher investment-to-stock price sensitivity after IFRS adoption.    
4.4. Firm-level characteristics and investment sensitivity to stock price around IFRS adoption 
Firm level characteristics may play a significant role in determining the impact on information 
asymmetry and the resulting improvement in investment-to-stock price sensitivity brought about by the 
events surrounding mandatory IFRS adoption.  Per Hypothesis 3, investment should become more 
sensitive to stock prices for firms with prices that convey more information to managers after an 
improvement in the information environment.  Managers in such firms may learn more new information 
from stock prices that are more informative following IFRS adoption.  With improvements in the quality 
of disclosure and in the comparability of financial statements, the costs associated with obtaining 
information should decrease; as such, more investors should be able to trade on their information and this 
will be impounded into stock prices, making them more informative for decision makers. Consistent with 
this view, several studies have found a significant improvement in stock price informativeness subsequent 
to IFRS adoption (see e.g. Beuselinck et al., 2010).  
While there is no direct way to measure the quantity of information in stock prices that is new to 
managers and other decision makers, all else equal, stock prices that are more informative should contain 
more information that is relevant for decision makers and managers.  We thus proceed to test Hypothesis 
3 by estimating Equation 1 using two proxies for stock price informativeness: 1) firm-specific stock 
return variation (ψ) following Morck, Yeung, and Yu. (2000), and 2) stock return autocorrelation 
conditional on trading volume (), following Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2002).   
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We compute our first measure of stock price informativeness, firm-specific return variation for 
each stock, following Morck et al. (2000).  We estimate firm-specific return variation from the following 
two-factor model, as in Fernandes and Ferreira (2008), using US dollar-denominated weekly returns: 
                                (2) 
where Rit represents stock i’s return in week t in excess of the risk-free rate; Rmt is the value-weighted 
excess local market return, and Rust is the value weighted excess US market return.  Stock price returns 
and market index returns are obtained from DataStream using the total return index, while the risk-free 
rate was obtained from Kenneth French’s website.  Following prior literature (Morck et al., 2000; Jin and 
Myers, 2006; Fernandes and Ferreira, 2008), our measure of firm-specific return variation, i, is a logistic 
transformation of the ratio of idiosyncratic volatility-to-total volatility (1-R
2
) that measures firm-specific 
return variation relative to market-wide variation:       [
      
  
].   
As our alternate measure of stock price informativeness, we use a measure based on stock return 
autocorrelation conditional on trading volume, following Llorente et al. (2002) and Fernandes and 
Ferreira (2009).  This measure captures the degree of information-based trading; the idea is that during 
periods of high volume, stocks with more information-based trading should display positive return 
autocorrelation.  To construct this measure, we run the following time-series regressions, following 
Fernandes and Ferreira (2008): 
                                           (3) 
where ri, t is the weekly stock return for firm i; VOi, t is the log turnover detrended by subtracting a 26-
week moving average.  Our variable of interest is i, which captures the degree of information-based 
trading.  We compute this measure for each firm-year.  
Because the adoption of IFRS has been associated with an increase in stock price 
informativeness, per Hypothesis 3, those firms that experience the largest increase in stock price 
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informativeness following IFRS should experience the largest increase in investment-to-stock price 
sensitivity.  The stock prices of such firms should contain more new information for decision makers, 
who can then use this information to help guide their investment decisions.  To this end, we divide stocks 
in each country based on the change in each measure of stock price informativeness around IFRS 
adoption; we group firms into high (low) informativeness if the change in i, (i) from year t-1 to year 
t+1 around IFRS adoption is above (below) the median for all firms in the country.  In some robustness 
tests (not reported), we also use the change in each measure from year t-3 to year t+3 around IFRS 
adoption to rank firms and find similar results.    
The results from these regressions are shown in Panel A of Table 6.  Per Hypothesis 3, firms with 
more informational content in their stock price should observe a more pronounced increase in investment-
to-stock price sensitivity.  We thus should observe a positive and significant coefficient on the triple 
interaction term (Qt-1 x Post x IFRS) for firms that experienced the largest increase in stock price 
informativeness.  This is what we find.  The interaction term is positive and significant for firms with a 
large increase (High group) in our measures of stock price informativeness around IFRS adoption.  Firms 
with a large increase in i, (i) experienced a significant improvement in the investment-to-stock price 
sensitivity following IFRS adoption relative to firms from countries that did not adopt IFRS.  In contrast, 
firms that experienced little change in stock price informativeness around the adoption of IFRS did not 
experience any significant change in investment sensitivity-to-stock price post-IFRS adoption.  In 
addition, the magnitude of the difference in this increase is significantly larger for firms that experience 
an increase in i.  From the results in Model 1, for firms that experience a large increase in stock price 
informativeness we observe no significant difference in investment-to-stock price sensitivity between 
firms from countries that adopt IFRS and the control group of firms prior to IFRS adoption (coefficient on 
Qt-1 x IFRS is 0.007 with a t-statistic of 0.43).  Post-IFRS, firms from countries that adopt IFRS 
experience a large increase in investment-to-stock price sensitivity relative to firms in the control group.   
As an example, a one standard deviation increase in Q (1.48) is associated with a 5.48% increase in 
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investment prior to the adoption of IFRS for firms that experienced a large increase in i; following IFRS 
adoption, the impact of a one standard deviation increase in Q is associated with a significantly higher 
9.62% increase in investment.
11
  The results are similar when using the alternate measure of stock price 
informativeness (i).  In contrast, the increase in investment-to-stock price sensitivity post-IFRS adoption 
is not significant for firms that experienced little or no change in stock price informativeness. The results 
are thus consistent with Hypothesis 3 and with the learning hypothesis.  The impact is stronger for stocks 
from which managers can potentially learn more new information after the improvement in the 
information environment.   
In additional robustness tests (unreported), we use an alternate measure of stock price 
informativeness to group firms.  In particular, we use the future earnings response coefficient, FERC,
12
 
following Durnev et al. (2003), and divide firms into groups of high and low informativeness based on 
changes on this measure pre and post-IFRS.  The results using this alternate measure of stock price 
informativeness are similar to the ones reported in Table 6.  
4.5.  Alternative explanation  - Need for external finance 
The results thus far show that the increase in investment-to-stock price sensitivity following IFRS 
adoption is concentrated in firms that experienced a significant improvement in stock price 
informativeness.  This suggests that IFRS adoption results in improvements in the informativeness of 
stock prices, consistent with the learning hypothesis.  Alternatively, the increase in investment-to-stock 
price sensitivity could be a result of firms having easier access to capital subsequent to IFRS adoption.  
Many studies document a decrease in cost of capital associated with the adoption of IFRS (Daske et al., 
2008; Li, 2010).  A decrease in the cost of capital should make it easier for firms with higher growth 
                                                                
11
 From Model 1 of Panel A of Table 6, for firms in our treatment group with a large increase in stock price 
informativeness, the increase in investment associated with a one standard deviation increase in Q (1.48) is 
[(0.03+0.007) x 1.48] =0.0548 prior to IFRS adoption.  Post-IFRS adoption, the increase is [(0.03+0.007+0.028) x 
1.48] = 0.0962. 
12
 The FERC measure is the coefficient on future earnings from estimations of annual stock returns on current and 
future annual earnings. 
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opportunities to increase investment by raising external capital; this in turn would impact the investment-
to-stock price sensitivity.  We thus examine whether this alternative explanation, and not the 
improvement in stock price informativeness, is driving our results.  If our results are driven by this 
alternative channel, firms with more need for external finance should experience a larger increase in 
investment sensitivity to stock price following IFRS adoption.  Such firms would be more inclined to 
raise external capital to finance their investments after IFRS adoption due to the reduction in their cost of 
capital.   
We examine this alternative by estimating Equation 1 separately for firms with high (low) need 
for external finance.  We use two proxies for the need for external finance: 1) the external finance 
dependence ratio following Rajan and Zingales (1998) – capital expenditures minus cash flows, scaled by 
capital expenditures, and 2) the financing deficit from Frank and Goyal (2003).
13
  We rank firms in each 
country as high (low) based on these two variables; firms with values above (below) the median are 
classified as high (low) need for external finance.  We report results from these regressions in Panel B of 
Table 6. 
The results in Panel B of Table 6 show that the improvement in investment-to-stock price 
sensitivity following IFRS adoption is not significantly related to firms’ access to external finance.  The 
results in Panel B show that the increase in investment-to-stock price sensitivity is significant for firms 
with high and low need for external finance.  The increase in investment-to-stock price sensitivity is not 
statistically different for firms with high and low external finance dependence.  In unreported results, we 
test for differences between the coefficients in the two equations and do not find a statistically significant 
difference (p-value of F-test is 0.99). These results do not support the view that improvement in firms’ 
access to external finance, as opposed to improvements in the informativeness of stock prices, are driving 
our results.  The results using the financing deficit also reveal no difference in the increase in investment-
                                                                
13
 The financing deficit is computed as the sum of cash dividends, investments, and net changes in working capital, 
less internal cash flows, scaled by total assets. 
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to-price sensitivity (p-value of F-test 0.84) between firms with low and high financing deficit, providing 
additional evidence against the claim that changes in access to finance are driving our results.  
4.6.  Investment –to-stock price sensitivity and performance 
We have documented an increase in investment-to-stock price sensitivity associated with the 
events surrounding IFRS adoption.  If this increase is a result of improvements in the information 
contained in stock prices and the information that stock prices convey to decision makers, we should 
observe a positive impact on future performance.  As stock prices become more informative for 
managers, they should be able to use that information to identify better investment opportunities (i.e. 
positive NPV projects).   This should translate into improved operating performance.  The improvement 
should be higher for firms whose stock prices are more informative.  Thus, firms that experience a higher 
increase in investment-to-stock price sensitivity should observe more significant improvement in 
performance. 
To directly test the above prediction, we would need a firm-level measure of the improvement in 
investment- to-stock price sensitivity (a firm-level coefficient of the interaction term (Qt1- x Post IFRS)).  
We cannot estimate such a measure directly because we do not have a sufficiently large number of 
observations for each firm to estimate this precisely.  Instead, we follow the approach taken by Focault 
and Fresard (2011) and estimate Equation 1 without the indicator of Post-IFRS and the respective 
interaction with Qt-1 for all firms in our treatment sample. We then collect the residuals from the 
regressions for each firm and construct an indicator variable, Pos, which is equal to one if firm i’s residual 
in year t is greater than 0 and zero otherwise.  As Focault and Fresard (2011) demonstrate, firms with 
positive (negative) residuals are those with a higher (lower) investment-to-stock price sensitivity, ceteris 
paribus.    
Using the indicator variable (Pos), we run the following regressions to determine whether future 
operating performance is associated with the increase in investment-to-stock price sensitivity: 
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                                                  (4) 
where PERFi,t+1 refers to two measures of firm performance: 1) return on assets, ROA, and 2) sales 
growth.  We measure performance as of one-year ahead (3-year average), following Focault and Fresard 
(2011) and include only the years subsequent to IFRS adoption.  Pos is the indicator variable that is equal 
to one for firm-year observations with positive residuals from the estimation of Equation 1 excluding the 
Post-IFRS indicator and the respective interactions, and zero otherwise; γi,t is a vector of firm-level 
controls that includes: 1) the log of total assets to control for firm size;  debt-to-assets as a proxy for 
leverage, and 3) cash-to-assets, and 4) property, plant and equipment-to-total assets to control for 
investment;  δi and φt refer to firm and year fixed effects, respectively.  We cluster standard errors at the 
firm level.  If firms with higher investment-to-stock price sensitivity perform better, we expect the 
coefficient on Pos (β) to be positive and significant, which would indicate that firms with a higher 
increase in investment-to-stock price sensitivity perform better than those that experienced no change or a 
reduction in investment-to-stock price sensitivity.  In unreported results, we replicate the results including 
the control group of firms; the results are similar to the ones presented here.   
 The results from the OLS estimation of Equation 4 are shown in Table 7.  The results show that 
on average, performance improves following IFRS adoption for firms that experience large increases in 
investment-to-stock price sensitivity.  Post-IFRS adoption, average 1-year ahead ROA is 0.60% higher 
for firms with a large increase in investment-to-stock price sensitivity, while sales growth is 13.3% 
higher.  There is no difference in ROA using the three-year average,
14
 but the difference in average sales 
growth is still significantly higher (8.8%) for firms with a larger increase in investment-to-stock price 
sensitivity.  Overall, these results suggest that firms experience an improvement in performance following 
IFRS that is correlated with the increase in investment-to-stock price sensitivity associated with IFRS 
adoption.  The results add support to the learning hypothesis that predicts that investment-to-price 
                                                                
14
 The reduction in the sample size may explain the lack of statistically significant results for the regressions using 
the three-year average ROA.  The number of observations drops from 71,819 (Model 1) to 25,038 (Model 2).   
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sensitivity, if driven by an improvement in the information content of stock prices, should be correlated 
with future performance.     
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we examine how changes in the information environment affect the investment-to-
stock price sensitivity.  Using mandatory adoption of IFRS as a natural experiment with exogenous 
variation in information asymmetry, we explore three hypotheses based on the learning hypothesis and 
related to the informational content in stock prices.  First, we posit that investment-to stock price 
sensitivity should increase following IFRS adoption due to a reduction in information asymmetry that 
increases the informational content of stock prices.  Second, we conjecture that the improvement in 
investment-to-stock price sensitivity should be stronger in countries with weaker ex-ante institutional and 
accounting quality.  Finally, we examine whether the improvement in investment-to-stock price 
sensitivity is more pronounced for firms that experience a more significant increase in stock price 
informativeness.    
Using a sample of 11,611 firms from 30 countries that adopted IFRS during our sample period 
and a control group of 13,557 firms from 20 countries, we find evidence supporting our three hypotheses.  
We document a significant increase in firms’ investment-to-price sensitivity following IFRS adoption that 
persists for years after IFRS adoption.  This relation is not present in years prior to IFRS adoption.  In 
addition, we find that the improvement in investment-to-stock price sensitivity is stronger for firms in 
countries with weaker ex-ante institutional and accounting quality.  This finding is consistent with the 
learning hypothesis and the view that changes in the information environment should benefit firms with 
lower ex-ante institutional quality, given that firms in countries with better institutional quality already 
have higher investment sensitivity-to-stock price (McLean et al., 2012).  In addition, countries with 
accounting standards that differ significantly from IFRS should experience the strongest impact from 
IFRS adoption.  Finally, we find that firms that exhibit a larger improvement in stock price 
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informativeness exhibit a stronger increase in investment-to-stock price sensitivity, which suggests that 
new informational content in stock prices is a plausible channel driving our results. 
Overall, our results are in line with the learning hypothesis and suggest that the reduction in 
information asymmetry associated with the events around IFRS adoption leads to improved stock price 
informativeness; managers learn from the new information conveyed from stock prices in making 
investment and other decisions, resulting in an increase in investment-to-stock-price sensitivity.  The 
positive association between investment-to-price sensitivity and future performance suggest that 
managers may be able to make better investment decisions after prices become more informative.   
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Table 1.  Sample description 
Table reports the number of firms, total number of observations, and the year of mandatory IFRS adoption for each of our sample 
countries that have adopted IFRS as of 2011 and for a control group of countries that have not adopted IFRS as of 2011.  Our 
treatment sample consists of 11,611 firms (90,880 firm-year observations) from 30 countries from 1990-2012.  The control group 
consists of 13,557 firms (68,890 firm-year observations) from 20 countries.   
    
Sample description  
IFRS Adopters 
 
Non-IFRS Adopters (Control Group) 
Country 
IFRS 
adoption # of firms # of obs. 
 
Country # of firms # of obs. 
Australia 2005 1,417 8,445 
 
Argentina 68 362 
Austria 2005 110 985 
 
Bangladesh 21 58 
Belgium 2005 139 1,396 
 
China 1,484 7,579 
Brazil 2010 114 744 
 
Colombia 36 119 
Bulgaria 2003 98 340 
 
Egypt 85 414 
Canada 2011 1,434 10,186 
 
India 1,044 5,137 
Chile 2009 167 1,923 
 
Indonesia 266 1,315 
Cyprus 2005 63 269 
 
Japan 2,491 15,516 
Czech Republic 2005 64 322 
 
Kenya 32 149 
Denmark 2005 221 2,384 
 
Malaysia 758 4,108 
Finland 2005 174 1,924 
 
Mexico 106 532 
France 2005 952 8,479 
 
Morocco 48 159 
Germany 2005 825 7,963 
 
Russia 201 571 
Greece 2005 274 1,738 
 
Saudi Arabia 85 366 
Hungary 2005 42 300 
 
South Korea 662 3,605 
Ireland 2005 81 777 
 
Sri Lanka 105 510 
Israel 2008 276 1,568 
 
Taiwan 698 3,846 
Italy 2005 364 3,496 
 
Thailand 408 2,207 
Jordan 2010 95 349 
 
United States 4,814 21,987 
Netherlands 2005 194 2,112 
 
Vietnam 145 350 
New Zealand 2007 122 1,023 
 
   
Norway 2005 316 2,297 
    Peru 2010 104 817 
    Poland 2005 209 830 
    Portugal 2005 78 720 
    Romania 2005 64 242 
    South Africa 2005 417 3,141 
    Spain 2005 161 1,773     
Sweden 2005 495 4,010     
United Kingdom 2005 2,541 20,327 
    TOTAL  11,611 90,880  TOTAL 13,557 68,890 
33 
 
Table 2.  Sample description 
Table shows descriptive statistics for firms in our treatment sample of 30 countries and the control group of 20 countries.  Our 
treatment sample consists of 11,611 firms (90,880 firm-year observations) from 30 countries from 1990-2012.  The control group 
consists of 13,557 firms (68,890 firm-year observations) from 20 countries.  Stock price and financial data are obtained from 
Thomson’s DataStream and WorldScope databases.  We exclude financial firms and utilities (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999 
and between 4900 and 4949) and firms with missing data on market value of equity, total assets, sales, and capital expenditures, 
as well as firms with assets below $10 million and those with negative sales.  Total assets are in US$ mil, reflecting 2010 pries; Q 
is the Tobin’s q measured as total assets less book value of equity plus market value of equity divided by book value of total 
assets;  CF-TA is cash flow (net income plus R&D and depreciation and amortization), scaled by lagged total assets; Capex-to-
PPEt-1 is the ratio of capital expenditure-to-lagged property, plant and equipment All firm-level variables are winsorized at top 
and bottom 1% of the distribution. 
Descriptive statistics 
Full sample 
Variable Mean Median Standard dev. N 
Total assets (US$M) 1,722 227.365 4,944 159,770 
Q 1.633 1.197 1.745 159,770 
CF-TA 0.067 0.080 0.187 159,770 
Capex-to-PPEt-1 0.282 0.171 0.379 159,770 
     
IFRS Adopters 
Variable Mean Median Standard dev. N 
Total assets (US$M) 1,655 181.907 4,918 90,880 
Q 1.593 1.192 1.733 90,880 
CF-TA 0.067 0.084 0.188 90,880 
Capex-to-PPEt-1 0.310 0.188 0.409 90,880 
     
Non-IFRS adopters (Control group) 
Variable Mean Median Standard dev. N 
Total assets (US$M) 1,811 290.401 4,978 68,890 
Q 1.686 1.204 1.761 68,890 
CF-TA 0.066 0.076 0.185 68,890 
Capex-to-PPEt-1 0.245 0.148 0.331 68,890 
 
34 
 
Table 3.  Main regressions.  Investment sensitivity to stock price 
Table shows results from panel regressions of investment on stock price for the period 1990-2012.  The dependent variable, 
investment, is the ratio of capital expenditure-to-lagged property, plant and equipment. Q is Tobin’s q, measured as total assets 
less book value of equity plus market value of equity divided by book value of total assets;  CF-TA is cash flow (net income plus 
R&D and depreciation and amortization), scaled by lagged total assets;  Log assetst-1 is the natural logarithm of lagged total 
assets, reflecting 2010 pries.  For the treatment group, Post IFRS is an indicator variable equal to one starting the year after 
mandatory IFRS adoption in the country and 0 otherwise; for the control group of countries, Post-IFRS is equal to one for years 
after 2005 and 0 otherwise.  IFRS is an indicator variable that equals one for countries that adopted IFRS during our sample 
period and 0 otherwise.  Model 3 shows results excluding voluntary adopters- firms that adopt IFRS prior to the year of 
mandatory adoption in their country.  Models 4 and 5, only include firms from the treatment sample of countries and their 
respective matches from the control group.  Each year, each firm in the treatment group is matched to a firm in the control group 
by industry (4-digit SIC code) and size. Models 6 and 7 only use firms in countries that have adopted IFRS including and 
excluding voluntary adopters, respectively.  Panel B shows results from various robustness tests.  Model 1 replicates results from 
model 1 in Panel A, but excluding firms from the US.  Model 2 reports results from a matched sample of firms, using the 
following procedure:  each country in the treatment group is matched to a country from the control group with similar accounting 
standards, using a measure of GAAP differences between countries from Bae et al. (2008).   Then, each year, each firm from the 
treatment group is matched by industry (4-digit SIC code) and size to a firm from its matched country in the control group.  
Models 3 and 4 show results using alternate proxies for investment; specifically; capital expenditures plus R&D expense–to-
lagged assets, and total asset growth rate.  Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics with standard errors clustered at the firm level are 
shown in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
  
Panel A – Baseline results 
 Full sample Matched sample IFRS adopters only 
  
Firm fixed-
effects 
Excludes 
voluntary  
Excludes 
voluntary  
Excludes 
voluntary 
 Dependent variable: Capital expenditure-to-lagged property, plant and equipment. 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Qt-1 x Post x IFRS 0.022*** 0.018*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 (3.81) (3.84) (3.91) (3.81) (3.92) (2.72) (2.72) 
Qt-1 x IFRS -0.004 -0.009** -0.006 -0.008 -0.009   
 
(-0.76) (-2.22) (-1.01) (-1.27) (-1.48)   
Qt-1  0.038*** 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 
 (15.01) (13.20) (14.99) (12.24) (12.20) (7.42) (7.00) 
CF-TA 0.126*** 0.195*** 0.127*** 0.120*** 0.121*** 0.123*** 0.126*** 
 
(11.46) (13.57) (11.17) (9.21) (8.94) (8.48) (8.13) 
Post IFRS 
-0.032** -0.041*** -0.030** -0.031** -0.028** -0.020 -0.017 
 
(-2.45) (-3.53) (-2.25) (-2.32) (-2.08) (-1.43) (-1.13) 
IFRS 
-0.076*** 
 
-0.023 -0.080** -0.026   
 
(-2.94) 
 
(-0.99) (-2.38) (-0.81)   
Log assets t-1 
-0.026*** -0.093*** -0.026*** -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.032*** -0.034*** 
 
(-32.02) (-21.25) (-31.49) (-29.88) (-29.58) (-27.95) (-27.58) 
Constant 
0.367*** 1.402*** 0.353*** 0.416*** 0.457*** 0.360*** 0.396*** 
 
(14.51) (24.52) (13.95) (11.50) (12.12) (10.76) (15.80) 
Country fixed effects Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No Yes No No No No No 
Observations 159,770 159,770 149,796 107,365 97,750 90,880 80,934 
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R-squared 0.143 0.368 0.145 0.145 0.149 0.146 0.150 
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Table 3.  Main regressions.  Investment sensitivity to stock price.  Continued. 
 
Panel B- Robustness tests 
 Dependent variable: 
 Capex-to-lagged PPE 
Capex + R&D-
to-lagged assets Asset growth 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Excludes US Matched sample   
Qt-1 x Post x IFRS 0.022*** 0.034*** 0.004** 0.014** 
 (3.89) (3.10) (1.99) (2.07) 
Qt-1 x IFRS -0.002 -0.016 -0.003* 0.002 
 
(-0.38) (-1.32) (-1.95) (0.26) 
Qt-1  0.037*** 0.048*** 0.016*** 0.043*** 
 (10.56) (10.30) (17.32) (16.35) 
CF-TA 0.137*** 0.120*** 0.042*** 0.164*** 
 
(10.38) (7.32) (6.37) (17.03) 
Post IFRS -0.035*** -0.021 -0.011** -0.059*** 
 
(-2.65) (-0.99) (-1.96) (-4.29) 
IFRS -0.095*** -0.039 -0.018 0.077*** 
 
(-3.31) (-0.64) (-1.49) (3.14) 
Log assets t-1 -0.025*** -0.035*** -0.005*** 0.002* 
 (-27.46) (-21.91) (-9.24) (1.70) 
Constant 0.391*** 0.458*** 0.086*** -0.117*** 
 (13.94) (8.17) (5.46) (-3.85) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects No No No No 
Observations 137,783 46,044 66,242 159,770 
R-squared 0.145 0.162 0.222 0.118 
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Table 4.  Event time regressions.  Investment sensitivity to stock price 
Table shows results from regressions of investment on stock price for our sample of IFRS adopters for the period 1990-2012.   
The dependent variable, investment, is the ratio of capital expenditure-to-lagged property, plant and equipment. Q is Tobin’s q, 
measured as total assets less book value of equity plus market value of equity divided by book value of total assets;  CF-TA is 
cash flow (net income plus R&D and depreciation and amortization), scaled by lagged total assets.  Log assetst-1 is the natural 
logarithm of lagged total assets, reflecting 2010 pries.  Lagged Q is interacted with various event time indicator variables (IFRS-τ- 
… IFRS+τ).  IFRSτ(-τ) is equal to one if year t is τ years after (before) IFRS adoption in the country (τ=-5,…,+5) and zero 
otherwise.  Models 1 and 2 show results for the full sample of IFRS adopting countries including and excluding voluntary 
adopters, respectively.  To conserve space, we do not report the coefficients on the event time indicator variables.  
Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics with standard errors clustered at the firm level are shown in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
   Event time regressions 
 Dependent variable: Capex-to-lagged PPE 
  (1) (2) 
  Excludes voluntary 
Q X IFRSt-5 -0.006 -0.008 
 
(-0.84) (-1.14) 
Q X IFRSt-4 0.006 0.007 
 
(0.90) (1.21) 
Q X IFRSt-3 0.002 0.002 
 
(0.41) (0.32) 
Q X IFRSt-2 0.010 0.009 
 
(1.12) (0.87) 
Q X IFRSt-1 0.012* 0.010 
 
(1.78) (1.62) 
Q X IFRSt 0.009 0.007 
 
(0.68) (0.57) 
Q X IFRSt+1 0.022** 0.021** 
 
(2.79) (2.55) 
Q X IFRSt+2 0.010* 0.009 
 
(1.75) (1.63) 
Q X IFRSt+3 0.004 0.002 
 
(0.84) (0.42) 
Q X IFRSt+4 0.047*** 0.050*** 
 
(8.86) (9.09) 
Q X IFRSt+5 0.021*** 0.020*** 
 
(3.51) (3.29) 
Qt-1 0.040*** 0.040*** 
 
(8.20) (7.93) 
CF-TA 0.119*** 0.121*** 
 
(7.67) (6.93) 
Log assets t-1 -0.032*** -0.034*** 
 
(-21.17) (-20.85) 
Constant 0.326*** 0.447*** 
 
(16.11) (21.98) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Observations 259,173 245,365 
Adj. R-squared 0.142 0.144 
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Table 5.  Investment sensitivity to stock price post IFRS: Country institutional quality 
Table shows results from regressions of investment on stock price based on different levels of institutional and accounting quality.   The dependent variable, investment, is the ratio 
of capital expenditures-to-lagged property, plant and equipment. Q is Tobin’s q, measured as total assets less book value of equity plus market value of equity divided by book 
value of total assets;  CF-TA is cash flow (net income plus R&D and depreciation and amortization), scaled by lagged total assets;  Log assetst-1 is the natural logarithm of lagged 
total assets, reflecting 2010 pries.  For the treatment group, Post IFRS is an indicator variable equal to one starting the year after mandatory IFRS adoption in the country and 0 
otherwise; for the control group of countries, Post-IFRS is equal to one for years after 2005 and 0 otherwise.  IFRS is an indicator variable that equals one for countries that 
adopted IFRS during our sample period and 0 otherwise.  We use four proxies for institutional quality and accounting quality: 1) legal origin of commercial laws – common and 
civil law, per La Porta et al. (1998); 2) the revised anti-director’s rights index (ADIR) from La Porta et al. (1998), revised in Djankov et al. (2008); 3) a measure of local GAAP 
differences from International Accounting Standards from Bae, et al. (2008), and 4) a measure of accounting quality and transparency that is the sum of earnings aggressiveness, 
loss avoidance, and earnings smoothing from Bhattacharya et al. (2003), and timeliness from Bushman et al. (2004).  Countries with values above (below) the median are classified 
as high (low).    Panel A reports results for the two proxies of institutional quality and Panel B shows results using the proxies for accounting quality.  Models (1)-(4) use the full 
sample and models (5)-(8) use the treatment firms and their respective matches. Each year, firms in the treatment group are matched to firms in the control group by 4-digit SIC 
code and size.  Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics with standard errors clustered at the firm level are shown in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
Panel A- By institutional quality 
 Full sample Matched sample 
  Common law Civil law High ADIR Low ADIR Common law Civil law High ADIR Low ADIR 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Qt-1 x Post x IFRS 0.006 0.034** 0.009 0.034* 0.006 0.031** 0.009 0.031* 
 
(0.46) (2.57) (0.73) (1.93) (0.46) (2.40) (0.75) (1.84) 
Qt-1 x IFRS 0.011 0.003 0.011 0.000 0.012 0.005 0.011 0.002 
 
(1.06) (0.18) (0.82) (0.03) (1.20) (0.29) (0.75) (0.10) 
Qt-1  0.034*** 0.029** 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.026** 0.032** 0.032*** 
 
(6.94) (2.69) (3.15) (5.57) (6.39) (2.26) (2.78) (4.51) 
CF-TA 0.100*** 0.222*** 0.107*** 0.143*** 0.091*** 0.212*** 0.094*** 0.162*** 
 
(10.56) (7.09) (6.32) (4.62) (7.59) (6.49) (5.95) (3.84) 
Post IFRS 0.046* -0.068* 0.029 -0.084** 0.050* -0.062* 0.033 -0.079** 
 
(1.90) (-1.98) (1.11) (-2.62) (1.86) (-1.82) (1.17) (-2.71) 
IFRS -0.052*** -0.124*** 0.067*** -0.132*** -0.269*** -0.111*** 0.088*** -0.129*** 
 
(-5.55) (-4.94) (3.39) (-6.92) (-15.82) (-7.44) (3.85) (-6.90) 
Log assets t-1 -0.030*** -0.021*** -0.025*** -0.027*** -0.033*** -0.027*** -0.031*** -0.030*** 
 (-11.20) (-4.55) (-5.66) (-7.54) (-10.30) (-6.98) (-8.99) (-8.74) 
Constant 0.236*** 0.398*** 0.178*** 0.458*** 0.553*** 0.467*** 0.304*** 0.462*** 
 (13.31) (7.82) (3.96) (12.44) (15.75) (9.66) (8.86) (8.19) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 80,258 79,512 85,824 72,903 54,723 52,642 59,926 46,942 
Adj. R-squared 0.143 0.148 0.156 0.132 0.149 0.154 0.154 0.144 
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Table 5.  Investment sensitivity to stock price post IFRS: Country institutional quality. Continued. 
Panel B- By accounting quality 
 Full sample Matched sample 
 GAAP difference Accounting quality GAAP difference 
quality 
Accounting quality 
Accounting quality   High  Low High  Low  High  Low High  Low  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Qt-1 x Post x IFRS 0.020** 0.012 0.003 0.021** 0.018** 0.013 0.003 0.021** 
 
(2.48) (1.00) (0.09) (2.33) (2.18) (1.01) (0.11) (2.38) 
Qt-1 x IFRS 0.019 0.004 0.021 -0.004 0.022* 0.003 0.007 0.000 
 
(1.69) (0.34) (1.03) (-0.57) (1.88) (0.28) (0.80) (0.06) 
Qt-1  0.030*** 0.034*** 0.036 0.038*** 0.025** 0.035*** 0.049*** 0.033*** 
 
(3.73) (6.26) (1.76) (13.24) (2.75) (11.83) (7.10) (6.21) 
CF-TA 0.225*** 0.097*** 0.100*** 0.125*** 0.211*** 0.090*** 0.081** 0.121*** 
 
(6.93) (9.95) (9.23) (6.82) (6.28) (7.33) (2.71) (5.09) 
Post IFRS -0.035 0.034 0.005 -0.102*** -0.028 0.039 0.009 -0.100*** 
 
(-1.29) (1.31) (0.12) (-5.28) (-1.03) (1.37) (0.20) (-4.91) 
IFRS -0.048*** 0.037** 0.030*** 0.085*** 0.065*** 0.035** -0.002 -0.041** 
 
(-3.19) (2.53) (4.83) (7.94) (4.91) (2.36) (-0.07) (-2.27) 
Log assets t-1 -0.019*** -0.033*** -0.023** -0.029*** -0.026*** -0.035*** -0.033*** -0.031*** 
 (-4.24) (-11.64) (-2.35) (-11.74) (-6.77) (-10.06) (-4.03) (-11.86) 
Constant 0.388*** 0.344*** 0.246** 0.511*** 0.489*** 0.357*** 0.300*** 0.489*** 
 (7.84) (11.22) (2.54) (19.12) (10.27) (12.24) (4.63) (10.32) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 83,990 72,869 34,231 113,390 52,556 53,058 20,378 81,786 
Adj. R-squared 0.147 0.143 0.173 0.140 0.151 0.145 0.172 0.141 
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Table 6.  Investment sensitivity to stock price post IFRS: Firm-level characteristics 
Table shows results from regressions of investment on normalized stock price (Tobin’s q) based on different levels of firm-level 
characteristics for firms from our sample of IFRS adopting countries.  The dependent variable, investment, is the ratio of capital 
expenditure-to-lagged property, plant and equipment. Q is Tobin’s q, measured as total assets less book value of equity plus 
market value of equity divided by book value of total assets;  CF-TA is cash flow (net income plus R&D and depreciation and 
amortization), scaled by lagged total assets; Log assetst-1 is the natural logarithm of lagged total assets, reflecting 2010 pries.  For 
the treatment group, Post IFRS is an indicator variable equal to one starting the year after mandatory IFRS adoption in the 
country and 0 otherwise; for the control group of countries, Post-IFRS is equal to one for years after 2005 and 0 otherwise.  IFRS 
is an indicator variable that equals one for countries that adopted IFRS during our sample period and 0 otherwise.  Panel A shows 
results using two proxies for stock price informativeness: 1) firm-specific return variation, ψ, following Morck et al. (2000), and 
2) stock return autocorrelation conditional on trading volume (), following Llorente et al. (2002).  The sample is divided  into 
groups of high & low price informativeness by computing the change in each measure from t-1 to t+1 around mandatory IFRS 
adoption in the country; firm with an above (below) median change in each measure are classified as high (low).  Panel B shows 
results using proxies for firms’ need of external finance: 1) dependence on external finance, following Rajan and Zingales (1998), 
and 2) the financing deficit, following Frank and Goyal (2003).  High & low need for external finance are based on each of these 
variables; firms with values above (below) the country median are classified as high (low).  Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics 
with standard errors clustered at the firm level are shown in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
Panel A – Measures of price informativeness  
 Dependent variable: Capex-to-lagged PPE 
 Measure: ∆ ψt-1,t+1 Measure: ∆ t-1,t+1 
  High Low High Low 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Qt-1 x Post x IFRS 0.028*** 0.002 0.022** 0.013 
 
(2.89) (0.13) (2.63) (0.71) 
Qt-1 x IFRS 0.007 0.014 0.012 0.001 
 (0.43) (1.36) (0.89) (0.07) 
Qt-1  0.030*** 0.034*** 0.031*** 0.039*** 
 (2.76) (6.69) (3.11) (5.95) 
CF-TA 0.189*** 0.148*** 0.184*** 0.146*** 
 
(6.07) (5.14) (5.57) (5.64) 
Post IFRS -0.072*** 0.040* -0.038* -0.047 
 
(-3.50) (1.69) (-1.76) (-1.22) 
IFRS -0.083*** -0.158*** -0.031** -0.053** 
 
(-4.94) (-6.61) (-2.08) (-2.44) 
Log assets t-1 -0.016*** -0.021*** -0.019*** -0.021*** 
 
(-5.26) (-4.76) (-6.12) (-4.97) 
Constant 0.344*** 0.408*** 0.366*** 0.384*** 
 
(8.47) (6.84) (7.37) (5.92) 
     Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 43,271 47,605 43,270 44,392 
R-squared 0.149 0.154 0.161 0.146 
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Table 6.  Investment sensitivity to stock price post IFRS: Firm-level characteristics. Continued. 
 
Panel B- Need for external finance 
 External finance dependence Financing deficit 
  High  Low High Low  
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Qt-1 x Post x IFRS 0.022* 0.022*** 0.021** 0.023** 
 
(1.83) (2.90) (2.55) (2.05) 
Qt-1 x IFRS -0.008 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 
 
(-0.85) (-0.20) (-0.49) (-0.38) 
Qt-1  0.045*** 0.034*** 0.037*** 0.034*** 
 
(8.19) (4.79) (7.87) (4.48) 
CF-TA 0.170*** 0.189*** 0.131*** 0.149*** 
 
(5.98) (9.07) (7.57) (7.90) 
Post IFRS -0.023 -0.040** -0.032 -0.040* 
 
(-0.89) (-2.22) (-1.21) (-1.74) 
IFRS -0.065*** -0.115*** -0.096*** -0.054*** 
 (-7.60) (-11.71) (-12.30) (-5.63) 
Log assets t-1 -0.032*** -0.017*** -0.032*** -0.022*** 
 (-9.71) (-6.53) (-8.94) (-7.61) 
Constant 0.420*** 0.304*** 0.396*** 0.381*** 
 
(9.96) (9.59) (8.53) (11.89) 
     Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 72,967 86,803 75,405 84,365 
R-squared 0.145 0.178 0.146 0.141 
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Table 7.  Investment sensitivity to stock price and performance 
Table shows results from OLS regressions of two measures of performance: 1) return on assets and 2) sales growth.  Performance 
measures are one-year-ahead (3-year average) and include only years following IFRS adoption.  Following Focault and Fresard 
(2011), Pos is an indicator variable that equals one for firms experiencing a large increase in investment-to-stock price sensitivity.  
To compute Pos, we run Equation 1 regressions excluding the post IFRS indicator and collect residuals for each firm-year.  Pos is 
equal to one if firm i’s residual in year t is greater than 0 and otherwise.  Control variables include the natural logarithm of total 
assets (in US$ mil, reflecting 2010 prices); the ratio of total debt divided by total assets; the cash-to-assets ratio, and a ratio of 
property, plant and equipment to total assets.  All control variables are measured as of t-1.  All regressions include year and firm 
fixed effects to control for other factors that may affect performance.  Heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics with standard errors 
clustered at the firm level are shown in parentheses.  *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Investment-to-stock price sensitivity and performance 
  (1) (2) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES ROA ROA Sales growth Sales growth 
 1-year ahead 3-year average 1-year ahead 3-year average 
Pos 0.006*** -0.002 0.133*** 0.088*** 
 (4.78) (-0.85) (36.40) (6.39) 
Log assets t-1 0.014*** 0.019*** -0.022*** -0.035*** 
 
(28.94) (20.50) (-21.56) (-6.71) 
Debt-to-assets t-1 -0.081*** -0.081*** 0.039*** 0.103* 
 
(-15.76) (-8.27) (3.73) (1.96) 
Cash-to-assets t-1 -0.153*** -0.050*** 0.128*** 0.159 
 
(-14.13) (-2.97) (5.82) (1.61) 
PPE-to-assets t-1 0.041*** 0.033*** 0.043*** -0.082 
 
(9.01) (3.98) (3.87) (-1.39) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     Observations 71,819 25,038 70,229 23,017 
R-squared 0.127 0.229 0.165 0.191 
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